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4% Absent = 100% Disaster:
Why the Math Doesn't Add Up on
Fixed Attendance Leave Policies Under the FMLA
Laraclay Parker'
You know, I think we need a paradigm shift .... I think for too long we have
thought about these kinds of work-family policies as luxury benefits. They
are not. [The FMLA] make[s] the difference between economic survival and
economic disaster for families in this country .... 2
ANN's employer, a large manufacturing firm, had been more than
understanding when she was diagnosed with breast cancer. Her supervisor
gave her information on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA or "the
Act") and told her she was entitled to intermittent or continuous leave totaling
twelve weeks of work time.' Thankfil for the support, Ann took six weeks of
intermittent leave in order to undergo surgery and chemotherapy treatments.
Shortly after ending her FMLA leave, Ann's son caught a minor cold at daycare.
Because she was her son's exclusive caretaker, Ann had to stay home with him
for two days while he was sick. To her shock, Ann was terminated upon her
return to work for violating her employer's 96% attendance rate policy. Since
she was terminated for absenteeism, Ann was not eligible for employee benefits;
she could no longer afford her apartment and became homeless. Leslie, Ann's
coworker, took off the same two days to care for her own sick child but was
not terminated. The only difference between these two workers' conditions of
employment is that Ann took FMLA leave.4
The scenario above illustrates the difficult legal-and deeply
personal-problems that occur when employers apply fixed attendance rate
policies ("the policy") to employees who have taken leave under the FMLA.s
Like most federal employment statutes, the FMLA prohibits an employer from
1 University of Kentucky College of Law,J.D. expected May 2014. 1 would like to thank Dale
Golden for his guidance and support in developing this research topic.
2 The r5 th Anniversary of the Family Medical Leave Act: Achievements and Next Steps: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, noth Cong. 6o (2oo8)
(statement of Debra Ness, President, National Partnership for Women and Families).
3 The Family and Medical Leave Act requires employers to give twelve weeks of leave, which
may be unpaid, to employees with serious health conditions or who are providing care to a family
member with a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(I), (c) (2012).
4 This scenario is a hypothetical situation designed to illustrate the problems with fixed rate
attendance polices under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2012).
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denying an employee benefits to which she is entitled under the statute.6 The
Act ensures this prohibition by creating a private cause of action that allows the
employee to bring suit in federal court if the employee's employer "interferes"
with her FMLA leave.' Courts have previously found that failing to prorate
performance goals and assessing absence points against an employee's leave
time interfered with the exercise of the employee's FMLA rights.' Under such
an interpretation of "interference," it would seem that Ann's employer's conduct
would also be illegal. Surprisingly, the few courts that have examined this issue
have differed on whether or not fixed attendance rate policies constitute FMLA
interference when applied to employees on FMLA leave.'
This Note argues that interference under the FMLA includes conduct that
does not directly deny an employee any allotted leave but simply treats FMLA
employees differently from non-FMLA employees, and, therefore, fixed
attendance rate policies interfere with the exercise of an employee's FMLA
rights by either denying the employee's right to reinstatement or denying the
employee her full entitlement of leave time. This Note will show that under
all three major branches of statutory interpretation the term "interference"
encompasses employer conduct that discriminates against FMLA employees
and non-FMLA employees in some term of their employment other than
their leave entitlement. Part I begins with an overview of the substantive
rights guaranteed under the FMLA, an examination of fixed rate attendance
policies that show that such policies treat FMLA and non-FMLA employees
differently, and a review of current conflicting case law on the fixed rate
attendance policy issue. Part II will apply the three main methods of statutory
construction-the plain meaning method, the legislative intent method,
and the common law method-to the interference language in the FMLA.
All three methods demonstrate that an interference cause of action encompasses
fixed rate policies because interference with an employee's rights can occur
through the application of a non-FMLA policy that treats FMLA employees
differently. o
6 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(i) (2012); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.254 (203) ("On return from FMLA leave, an
employee is entitled to be returned to the same position the employee held when leave commenced,
or to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of
employment.").
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(I), 2617(a)(2) (2012).
8 See Wojan v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 07-11544, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69576, at *11-12 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 15,2008) (finding summary judgment for defendant-employer inappropriate); Fisher v.
Pohlman, Inc., No. 4 :o6CVoI76i AGF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *-2 (E.D. Mo.Jan. 23,2007)
(denying employer's motion to dismiss).
9 Dickinson v. St. Cloud Hosp., No. 07- 3346 ADM/RLE, 2oo8 WL 4659562, at *4 (D. Minn.
Oct. 20,2008) (summarizing cases on both sides of the split). Compare Payton v. Fed. Express Corp.,
No. i:o6-CV-oo333 , 2o6 VVL 2715163, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2oo6) (finding interference), with
Keasey v. Fed. Express Corp., No. s:o 3-CV- 22 8, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27398, at *3-4, *7 (WD.
Mich. Dec. 3, 2003) (finding no interference).
to See Sandra F Sperino, Flying without a Statutory Basis. hy McDonnell Douglas Is Not
[VOL. 1o21052
4% ABSENT = 100% DISASTER
I. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE FMLA, FIXED RATE ATTENDANCE
POLICIES, AND RELEVANT CASE LAw
A. 7he FMLA Provides Employees with Suhstantive Rights and
Causes ofAction to Vindicate Those Rights.
Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 to close an important gap in workplace
legislation; the Act's aim was "to balance the demands of the workplace with
the needs of families" and "to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for
medical reasons."n Before the Act, workers who needed to take substantial time
off to undergo chemotherapy, care for a dying parent, or have surgery were
left to the whim of employers that might terminate them because of these
medically necessary and temporary absences. 2
FMLA rights are triggered when a qualified employee or a member of an
employee's family has a "serious health condition" necessitating "continuing
treatment by a health care provider."" Generally, the FMLA entitles employees
to take twelve weeks off from work because of a variety of health issues.14 An
employee may either take this leave in one block of time or, if the employer
Just iedbyAny Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REV. 743 (2oo6). Sperino delineates
three broad categories of statutory interpretation and discusses each of them, proving that the
Supreme Court's opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is unwarranted
under any statutory interpretation method. Sperino, supra, at 762. Under the settled principles of
administrative law, some may see similarity in structure to the Chevron test, promulgated by the
Supreme Court in Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843
(19 84 ).The statutory analysis performed in this Note, though similar to that in a Chevron deference
analysis, is chiefly focused on private interference causes of action. The Chevron test swings into
play when a court is reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of a term in its organic
statute. Id. at 842. Because agencies are due some form of deference when interpreting their own
statutes, the Chevron test requires that a reviewing court uphold an agency's opinion of its own
statute whenever that opinion is reasonable. Id. at 844. But, if the statute is unambiguous regarding
the provision that the agency has interpreted, no deference is due and it is the court's job to state
what the law is according to Congress's intent. Id. at 842-43. In suits brought by the Department of
Labor, which is the agency that governs the administration of the FMLA, such deference would be
due. But, because most suits challenging and interpreting the law will be brought by private parties,
this Note has taken a more generalized approach to statutory interpretation, as any of the three
methods discussed in this Note could be used by a court reviewing a private party's interpretation of
the FMLA. Nevertheless, if a court finds itself reviewing the Department of Labor's interpretation
of "interference" to include fixed rate attendance policies, Part II of this Note may be called upon
to bolster a claim that interpreting interference to cover such policies is reasonable under Chevron.
11 29 U.S.C. § 26oi(b)(I)-(2) (2012); see also Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F 3d 151,
159 (ist Cit. 1998).
12 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S259-6o (1993) (statement of Sen. Dodd on the passage of the
FMLA) ("[The FMLA] embodies a simple.. .but critically important idea: short-term job security
for working people in times of family or medical emergency.").
13 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2012).
14 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(I) (2012).
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and employee agree, intermittently over the course of a year." If her condition
persists after one year, the employee must recertify her FMLA leave in order
to be eligible for more leave."6 An employer must allow a qualified employee
with a covered health issue to take her leave after she has given proper notice of
leave, and that employee must make a reasonable effort to not unduly disrupt
the operations of the employer." The FMLA requires that an employee be
reinstated to her position or an equivalent position after her leave."1 The terms
of her reinstatement must include all benefits accrued prior to her leave and any
benefits she would have been entitled to if FMLA leave had not been taken."
The FMLA created two different causes of action, "retaliation" and
"interference," under which employees may vindicate their rights.20 FMLA
retaliation resembles traditional Title VII retaliation claims; in order to
prevail on a retaliation claim, an employee must show she suffered an adverse
employment action because she took FMLA leave.2' In contrast, the interference
cause of action requires a plaintiff to prove that her employer "interfere[d] with,
restrain[ed], or den[ied]"the FMLA rights to which she was entitled.22 In order
to prevail under this theory, the employee must show that she has actually been
damaged by her employer's actions.23
B. FixedAttendance Rate Policies Mathematically Discriminate
Against Employees on FMLA Leave.
Most employers choose to promulgate policies addressing employee
absences. Because employee absences are also covered by a federal scheme,
employers may often find themselves restricted by federal law when drafting
policies. As with any complex federal law, employers may be in violation of
some obscure administrative regulation by mistake. Such is the case with
percentage-based attendance policies under the FMLA.24 While appearing
15 Id. § 2612(b)(I).
16 Dep't of Labor Op. Ltr., FMLA 200 5-2-A (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.dol.
gov/whd/opinion/FMLA/2005/2oo5o9-1 4 _2AFMLA.htm.
17 Id. § 2612(e)(I)-(2).
18 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(I) (2012).
19 Id. § 2614(a)(2)-(3).
20 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(I)-(2) (2012); see, e.g., Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F3 d 1041,1050
(8th Cir. 2006).
21 E.g., Stallings,4 47 F.3 d at 1o51; see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2).
22 29 U.S.C. § 26I5(a)(i).
23 Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 'o (2002).
24 This Note assumes that employers who use fixed attendance rate policies do not promulgate
the policies specifically to deny FMLA employees the rights of which they are entitled under the
Act. If an employer did maintain the policy for that reason, then an employee could bring an action
for retaliation under the FMLA, which would require the employee to prove her employer's intent
to treat her unfavorably for taking FMLA leave. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Dollar Gen., Inc., 88o F. Supp.
2d 967, 990 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (stating that "a retaliation claim ... requires proof of an impermissible
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neutral, these policies can actually interfere with an employee's unimpeded
exercise of her FMLA rights.25
Under a fixed attendance rate policy, an employer picks an arbitrary
percentage of scheduled days over a period of time during which an employee
must attend work.2 6 The employer then calculates the percentage of days an
employee works within the policy's applicable time period and compares each
employee's percentage of worked days to the percentage of days excused by the
policy.27 If the employee's percentage of attendance is less than the arbitrary
percentage in the policy, then the employee may incur some form of discipline.28
Fixed attendance ratt policies become problematic for employees who take
FMLA leave intermittently. Employers usually have a policy that states that
FMLA days will not be counted as absences for the calculation of an employee's
percentage of days worked. 29 However, fixed attendance rate policies allow an
employer to deduct the number of FMLA days taken from the number of total
days worked in calculating the percentage of overall days worked."o
It is helpful to return to Ann's story to see how removing FMLA days
from days worked mathematically impacts the intermittent leave employee.
Assume that Ann's employer used a policy that demands 96% attendance over a
three-month period along with a provision that failure to comply will result in
termination. Ann's coworker, Leslie, who was similarly situated to Ann in every
discriminatory animus").
25 See, e.g., Dickinson v. St. Cloud Hosp., No. 07-3346 ADM/RLE, 2008 WL 4659562, at 6
(D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2008); Payton v. Fed. Express Corp., No. I:06-CV-oo 333 , 2006 WL 2755163, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2oo6).
26 E.g., Dickinson, 2oo8 VVL 4659562, at *1 (stating that under the St. Cloud Hospital policy at
issue, absenteeism rates exceeding 4% would be referred for supervisor review); EMPRS RESEARCH
COUNSEL, ERC ABSENCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICEs SURVEY 68 (2012) [hereinafter ERC
SURVEY], available at http://www.yourerc.comLCE/pagecontent/Documents/survey/research-
studies/20s2-Absence-Management-Survey-Report.pdf (a private human resources research firm
reporting that one respondent's policy required "97% [attendance] not counting vacation, personal
day[s], or FMLA [leave]").
27 See, e.g., ERC SURVEY, supra note 26, at 59-69 (reporting a sampling of respondents'policies
and calculation methods).
28 See, e.g., id. at 68 (reporting that one respondent's excessive absence policy reflected a
progressive discipline procedure resulting in termination after three warnings).
29 Courts generally agree that counting FMLA days as absences and administering
disciplinary action for them is a clear-cut case of interference and, perhaps, retaliation under the
Act. See Bachelder v. Am. W Airlines, Inc., 259 F3 d 112, 1132 (9 th Cir. 200).
30 See, e.g., Dickinson, 2008 WL 4659562, at *I; ERC SURVEY, supra note 26, at 68.
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respect, was scheduled to work 480 hours over the three-month period."' Leslie
missed two days of scheduled work during that time period. Her percentage of
days worked would be calculated as follows:
Hours Worked = 464 = 96.6%32
Hours Scheduled 480
Ann's attendance for three months, in which she took six weeks (thirty
days, or 240 hours) of FMLA leave and missed two days for a non-FMLA
reason-such as caring for a child with a minor illness-will be calculated as
follows:
Hours Worked = 224 = 93.3%
Hours Scheduled - FMLA Days 240
Despite the fact that Ann and Leslie missed the same amount ofscheduled work,
Leslie would not be subject to discipline under the employer's absence policy,
but Ann would be terminated because she took FMLA days. Ann's number of
total hours worked would be so heavily discounted because of her FMLA leave
that any non-FMLA absences would greatly affect her overall attendance
record, dropping her below the 96% threshold. This policy effectively treats
those employees on FMLA leave differently than those not on FMLA leave.
C. Case Law on FixedAttendance Rate Policies Is in Conflict About
Whether or Not the Policy Constitutes Interference.
Several district courts have reviewed fixed attendance rate policies and have
split on the question of whether an employer's withholding of FMLA days as
"days worked"is interference with an employee's rights under the FMLA.33 The
Western District of Michigan first confronted the policy in Keasey v. Federal
Express Corp.34 In Keasey, the court granted summaryjudgment for the defendant
on the plaintiff's interference claim, stating that counting the employee's FMLA
days as days worked would operate as a "windfall" by essentially recording
"a perfect attendance record during [the employee's] FMLA leave period.""
31 While 48o hours may sound considerable, it simply reflects how many hours a full time
employee will work in three months when operating on a forty-hour workweek schedule.
32 An eight-hour workday is assumed for all calculations in this Note.
33 See Dickinson, zoo8 WL 4659562, at *5; Payton v. Fed. Express Corp., No. r:o6-CV-oo333 ,
2oo6 WL 2715163, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2006); Keasey v. Fed. Express Corp., No. I:o3-CV- 228,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27398, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2003).
34 Keasey, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27398, at *i.
35 Id. at *7.
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It compared the policy to freezing an employee's probationary status while on
leave, which other courts had found permissible under the Act.36
Three years later, Payton v. Federal Express Corp. examined the same Federal
Express policy at issue in Keasey to determine whether it conflicted with the
FMLA. Payton discussed, but declined to follow, the Keasey court's rationale,
instead finding that Federal Express's leave policy constituted interference.
The Payton court reasoned that taking the plaintiff's FMLA days from the
absence rate denominator was in fact counting FMLA days under a no-fault
attendance policy, which is an action explicitly prohibited as interference under
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)." This regulation defines interference as any action that
discriminates or retaliates against FMLA and non-FMLA employees."
After Keasey and Payton, the District Court of Minnesota considered the
leave issue in Dickinson v. St. Cloud Hospital and discussed both courts' take
on FMLA interference before siding with the Payton court.3 9 The Dickinson
court supported its ruling by referencing the discriminatory effect of the fixed
rate attendance policy: "By virtue of the fact that [the plaintiff] elects to take
FMLA leave, [the plaintiff] is allowed fewer nonFMLA [sic] absences, which
results in a negative factor for purposes of an employment action."
Keasey, Payton, and Dickinson offer contrasting results for the same policy
because the Keasey court approached the requirements for an interference
cause of action differently than the Payton and Dickinson decisions. Keasey's
windfall rationale grows out of the idea that an interference cause of action
must be related to a denial of rights under the FMLA. Since the FMLA does
not guarantee that an employee can miss work for non-FMLA reasons, taking
negative action against an employee who engages in such conduct cannot be
interference. 41
Payton and Dickinson advance the argument that interference with an
employee's rights need not be interference with an employee's FMLA rights
specifically. Instead, interference can occur when an employer's policy addressing
some other facet of employment affects FMLA employees differently than
non-FMLA employees. Thus, while Keasey allows employment policies with
a disparate impact on FMLA employees to exist under the Act, Payton and
Dickinson do not.
In order to decide which court has formulated the correct response to
the policy, it will be necessary to find out whether the interference cause of
3 6 Id.
37 Payton, 2006 WL 2715163, at *5-
38 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2013).
39 Dickinson v. St. Cloud Hosp., No. 07-3346 ADM/RLE, zoo8 WL 4659562, at *4-5 (D.
Minn. Oct. 20, 2008).
40 Id. at *5-
41 See, e.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F3 d 1253, 1261-62 (ioth Cir. 1998) (holding
that an employee on FMLA leave is entitled to no greater protection from a firing for a non-
FMLA reason than an employee not on FMLA leave).
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action supports fact patterns where the employer promulgates policies that
do not address the FMLA itself but affect FMLA employees differently than
non-FMLA employees. In a case of interference, the employee's rights will
actually be denied in two separate ways depending on when the policy functions
against them. If the employee is terminated in the midst of her leave, then
she will be denied the remainder of the leave she is entitled to as well as her
reinstatement rights. If the employee is terminated after her leave ends, then
she will be denied her right to reinstatement.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SCOPE OF THE INTERFERENCE CAUSE
OF ACTION Is BROAD ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS POLICIES THAT HAVE THE
EFFECT OF TREATING FMLA EMPLOYEES DIFFERENTLY THAN
NON-FMLA EMPLOYEES.
Statutory interpretation is a broad field of legal study with many
methodological theories.42 Rather than attempting to advance any one theory
of statutory interpretation, this Part will analyze the FMLA by using the three
major analytic frameworks of statutory interpretation:43 (1) the plain meaning
method, (2) the statutory interpretation method, and (3) the common law
method." In doing so, the analysis will replicate how a variety of courts might
approach the issue of deciding what the Act means in the context of fixed
attendance rate policies. 45 These results, gleaned from the application of the
three major methods to the Act, will then be compared to the Keasey and the
Payton/Dickinson decisions to determine whether either result was correct about
with regard to the scope of the Act.
42 To see how varied this field truly is, see, for instance, John F Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, io6 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 78 (2006) (arguing for a textualist approach
because it more accurately reflects the semantic context), and William D. Popkin, The Collaborative
Model ofStatutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543-544 (1988) (arguing for a collaborative
approach that draws from both the reader's subjective interpretations and constructive textual
meaning).
43 Sperino, supra note io, at 762 (identifying these categories of statutory interpretation and
advocating for several caveats in understanding the depth and utility of her categories).
First, this Article is not attempting to make any descriptive, evaluative, or normative
claim about any particular statutory construction methodology over another ... The
solution offered to correct the existing problem is consistent with all of the discussed
methodologies, thus requiring no choice between them. Second, the Article is not
intending to suggest that the methodologies can be neatly pressed into the general
categories used in this section.... Rather, the goal of this section is to describe the
contours of each statutory construction method in a way that is conducive to exploring
those methods in conjunction with Title VII.
Id. at 763. The same methodological caveats apply to this analysis.
44 See id. at 762.
45 See id at 763 -64.This Note also uses Sperino's method of analysis in attempting to replicate
how courts may approach the interference issue as applied to fixed attendance rate policies.
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A. The Plain Meaning Method: Introduction andApplication
The approach advocated by the plain meaning method is apparent from
its name; it asks courts to examine the words of the Act itself to deduce
congressional intent.46 It rests on the assumption that "only the language
actually adopted by the legislature is law," and thus requires courts to look
no further in interpreting the statute than to what successflly passed both
congressional bodies. 47 In approaching the statute's language, the method first
determines whether the statute sufficiently defines the word at issue, either
through a traditional definitions section or through association with other
words. 48 If not, then the method explores contemporary dictionaries and other
writings to determine how certain words would have been understood by the
legislators at the time of the statute's enactment. 49
The FMLA's language never directly addresses fixed attendance rate
policies.s0 Because of this hole, the plain meaning analysis of whether
interference encompasses these policies, then, will focus on finding whether the
statute ever mentions what types of employer actions are necessary to sustain an
interference cause of action, either through a definitions section or in relation
to other terms in the statute.The statute's text begins with a definitions section,
but it fails to provide a definition for what type of employer conduct constitutes
interference.s" In fact, the term "interference" is only mentioned twice in the
statute: once to create the cause of action52 and once to ban interference with
proceedings under the Act."
46 U.S. Gov'r ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-0 4 -26iSP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-71 to 2-78 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/21o/202437.pdf.
47 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MicH. L. REV. 20, 23 (1988).
Note that the plain meaning approach differs from the legislative intent approach, which advocates
examining the text of a statute and then moving on to consider the legislative history. Compare
BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176,183 (2004) (citations omitted) ("The preeminent canon
of statutory interpretation requires us to 'presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.'), with Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA.
L. REV- 347, 348 (2005) ("[I]ntentionalists try to identify and enforce the 'subjective' intent of the
enacting legislature, while textualists care only about the 'objective'meaning of the statutory text.").
This legislative intent analysis will be taken up in Part II.B.
48 E.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379,388-89 (2009) (turning to Webster's and Black's Law
dictionaries to interpret a statute's terms).
49 Id. See also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 2o8 F 3 d 871,876 (ioth Cir. 2000).
50 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2012).
51 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012).
52 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(i) (2012).
53 The provision of the Act entitled "Interference with Proceedings or Inquiries" appears at 29
U.S.C. § 2615 (b) and states,"It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual because such individual ... has filed any charge ... ." Usually,
one could examine this language for clues about what "interference" in section (a) means because
both sections use the word "interference." See Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
152, 159 (1993) (citations omitted) (applying the following statutory construction rule to income
2013-20141 1059
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The section of the Act that creates the interference cause of action states:
"It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter."5 4
From the statutory language, it is clear that employer conduct must inhibit
the rights guaranteed by the FMLA in any of the three ways described. Such
an interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide that no interference cause of action
will lie where the plaintiff has not been actually harmed by the defendant's
conduct.ss While the statute does address what result the conduct must have,
it unfortunately fails to state what kind of employer conduct is required to
support a claim of interference.
In creating the cause of action, the FMLA's text states that employer
interference must interfere with "the exercise, or the attempt to exercise,"
FMLA rights. One could interpret such language to mean that an employer's
interference must be an action that directly curtails the exercise of FMLA
rights-such as denying an employee an FMLA day or refusing to certify her
FMLA time. But this interpretation does not give effect to the plain meaning
of the statute and instead inserts a requirement for a type of employer conduct
when there is none.s6 The Act itself never mentions how an employer might
interfere with, restrain, or deny an employee's FMLA rights. Therefore, the
most natural reading of the statute is that it prohibits any conduct by employers
that affects the enjoyment of FMLA rights, whether that conduct is directed
specifically at FMLA rights or has incidental effects on FMLA rights.
The text of the statute is clear by its silence on the matter of what employer
conduct constitutes interference: any employer conduct that denies or inhibits
FMLA rights falls under this cause of action. Because fixed attendance rate
policies have the effect of denying employees FMLA rights, employers may be
held liable for applying them to FMLA employees without counting FMLA
days as days worked in making the rate calculation.
This conclusion should end a court's inquiry under the plain meaning method.
Since the statute's meaning is clear, a court need not explore contemporary
tax cases: "It is a 'normal rule of statutory construction,' that 'identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning."'). However, the language used in
the "Interference with Proceedings or Inquiries" section is identical to the language used to create
the retaliation cause of action under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). It would therefore be
improper to graft the retaliation language into the interference cause of action through this canon
of statutory construction.
54 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(i).
55 Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 8s, 81-82 (2002).
56 This is a common canon of statutory construction. See, e.g., State v. LeClair, 287 P3 d 875,
875-876 (Kan. 2012) (holding that a "address of residence"required under sex offender statutes could
not include defendant's one night stay on a park bench); State v. Trujillo, 16o P 3d 577 ,582 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2007) (declining to read an age threshold onto the state's definition of"mental retardation");
Trigg v. Sanders, 515 N.E.2d 1367, 1374-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (declining to read into a statute a
prohibition on modifying teachers'suspensions during a statutory 6o-day appeal period).
1060 [ VOL. 102
4% ABSENT = 100% DISASTER
dictionaries and other writings to determine the meaning of the statute.s"
Furthermore, if a court attempted to do so, it would run across an unsolvable
practical problem; since there is no word in the statute that addresses what kind
of employer conduct is necessary to precipitate a violation, there would be no
words for the court to define in dictionary terms or through other writings. The
court would therefore be forced to accept either that the statute is clear, or to
abandon the plain meaning inquiry and proceed to an analysis of the statute
under the legislative intent approach, delineated in Part II.B, below.
B. The Legislative Intent Approach: Introduction and Application
The body of thought comprising the legislative intent approach is fraught
with differing methods and attempts at unifying the theory." But, at its most
basic, the legislative intent method requires courts to first examine the plain
meaning of the statute through the procedure outlined in the above section."
The legislative intent approach first requires to court to undertake a
plain meaning analysis, demonstrated in Part II.A.6 0 If the statute remains
ambiguous"1 despite the plain meaning inquiry, then courts will examine the
legislative history of the statute in order to find the legislative intent behind
the ambiguous terms.6 1 Courts will look at several fonts of legislative history
to make their intent determinations including permutations of the bill,
57 See State v. Daniel, 1o3 S.W 3 d 822, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that when the meaning
of a statute is unambiguous, courts do not have to resort to other methods of statutory construction,
including dictionaries).
58 Compare Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,1335-1336 (1990) (critiquing the
strict textualist approach and arguing for a method that approaches statutory interpretation like a
"question of fact"), with Victoria E Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J 70, 109-113 (2012) (arguing for rules of legislative procedure that
would inform, and make more predictable, statutory interpretation). Use of the approach in and of
itself is also controversial for several judges, most notably Justice Scalia,who criticizes the use of the
approach for its illegitimacy and indeterminacy, noting, "If one were to search for an interpretive
technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more
promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case nicely proves that point." Conroy
v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
59 See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1997).
6o See e.g., Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 893, 898 (Wis. 200).
61 Determining ambiguity is beyond the scope of this Note. For information about the
complexity of the doctrine and the difficulty courts have in applying it, see Ward Farnsworth et al.,
AmhiguityAboutAmhiguity:An Empirical Inquiry into LegalInterp retation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 257
(2010). However, the fact that the ambiguity analysis is outside of this Note's scope does not affect its
critical analysis. In order to address the meaning of interference under each statutory interpretation
method, this Note simply assumes that some judges would find the statute ambiguous.
62 See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (explaining that if the statutory text is
nonsurplusage (i.e., it refers to an ambiguous component of the statute) the plain meaning method
will not suffice).
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committee reports, floor debates, and any ex post facto regulations addressing
the ambiguous terms.63
Not surprisingly, the legislative history of the Family Medical Leave Act
never directly addresses fixed attendance rate policies and whether or not they
might constitute interference under the Act. It might be argued that such a
gap in the legislative history means that the Act does not reach the policy, and
therefore the policy cannot be interference. An examination of the legislative
history reveals that legislators never discussed the specific content of any
employer policy and yet some employer policies have been found to conflict with
an employer's duties under the Act." It is a more accurate interpretation of the
legislative history to say that Congress legislated to prohibit broad categories of
conduct under which discrete actions could fall. Just because Congress did not
mention each discrete action does not mean it is allowed by the Act. The goal of
this legislative intent inquiry, then, should be to establish the outer parameters
of the interference cause of action to see if interference is expansive enough to
cover the policy at issue.
Unfortunately, legislators did not devote much of their time to discussing
the meaning of the term "interference." In fact, the main thrust of the FMLA
debate was one of tension between the interests of small businesses and working
women. 6s The debate centered on whether government should be regulating
employers at all, not on whether these specific regulations were sound. 66 Floor
speeches and committee reports addressed the interference cause of action
perfunctorily.67 But there were several occasions when legislators mentioned
the cause of action by name. This legislative history analysis therefore begins
by examining those times when members of Congress overtly discussed
interference to see if those passages shed any light on how far the interference
cause of action should stretch.
While interference may not have been a primary concern, many legislators
considered the litigation effects that the FMLA might have on small businesses.
Discussions about the cost oflitigation to small businesses found in the legislative
63 Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly
Enacted Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 161-63 (1989). Ex post facto regulations may be the
lowest on the totem pole when deciding what a statute means, but many courts have used them
when deciding legislative intent. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267, 289
(1974); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109-IO (1980).
64 E.g., 29 C.FR. § 825.220(c) (2013) (prohibiting employers from enacting policies that treat
FMLA and non-FMLA employees differently for benefits purposes).
65 See generally 136 CONG. REc. Sr2,j6i (Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (referring to
the FMLA as "pro-family legislation").
66 See generally 136 CONG. REc. Hio44 (Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Ballenger) (opposing
the bill and pointing out that "[tihe issue is not whether the leave is a good policy to pursue, the
issue remains the appropriate role for Government").
67 139 CONG. REc. S65o (1993) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (illustrating that even when
introducing the bill in its final round of debates, Senator Dodd never mentioned the interference
cause of action).
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history of the FMLA correlates to the scope of the interference provision.Thus,
the legislative history analysis will conclude with an examination of the debate
on the litigation costs of the FMLA to determine how the debate affects the
understanding of what "interference" means.
1. Congress's Overt Discussions of Interference Show that FMLA Interference
Can Occur Within a Policy that Does Not Specifically Deny FMLA Rights.-
The language that now comprises the interference portion of the FMLA
was introduced in 1986, in the first draft of the Act, which was entitled "The
Parental and Medical Leave Act."68 The provision survived intact over the
course of seven years and two presidential vetoes. 9 But even in the earliest
stages of the bill's development, interested parties worried about the scope of
the FMLAs private causes of action. Only a month after its introduction, during
the Joint Hearing before the House Education and Labor Committee, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Council of Small Businesses expressed concern
that the interference cause of action was too "loosely worded."o Speaking for
the organization, Susan Hager gave an example of how the loose wording of
the statute might affect employers: "[W]hat would keep an employee from
accusing that employer of 'interference' with the employee's right to take the
leave?"' The committee report expressed anxiety about employment litigation
exploding because of the FMLA.72
After these initial worries and a failed attempt to pass the Parental and
Medical Leave Act in 1989, different congressional committees endeavored
to explain why the interference cause of action was not overbroad. In 1989,
the House report that would have accompanied the Act, designated HR 770,
noted that interference should not apply to an employer's attempt to make sure
leave benefits are exercised properly.73 Furthermore, in 1989, both the House
and Senate sought to more concretely define the interference cause of action
in committee reports. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
stated that the FMLA's causes of action addressed "[the situation where] an
employer, in certain circumstances, may seek to induce an employee not to take
the entitled leave," and the causes of action under the FMLA were directed at
employer action.74
During floor debates, legislators indicated what the FMLA causes of action
should provide protection by describing conduct prohibited by the statute.
68 H.R. 4 3 00, 9 9 th Cong. (1986).
69 Compare H.R. 4300, 9 9th Cong. § io8(a)-(b) (1986), with 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)-(b) (2012).
7o The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986. Joint Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor-
Mgmt. Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the H Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 9 9 th
Cong. 67 (1986) [hereinafter r986 Parental and Medical LeaveActJoint Hearing] (statement of Susan
Hager, representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 H.R. REP. No. IOI-28, pt. 2, at 26 (1989).
74 S. REP. No. I10-77, at 47 (1989).
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In his 1990 statement on the introduction of the FMLA to the Senate, Senator
Packwood painted a picture of the conduct that the FMLA was meant to stop:
"What we are saying with this bill is simple justice: A single mother shouldn't
be forced to lose her job to take care of a dangerously ill child. A father should
be able to count on returning to work after taking care of his family's emergency
at home."75
From the beginning, members of Congress and the public expressed
concern about how far interference reached into the private sector. Based
upon early statements made by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Council on
Small Businesses, it is clear that employers opposed the interference provision
applying to situations in which employers tried to make sure that leave was
being exercised appropriately. One could argue that this debate about how
employers could ensure leave benefits were exercised properly had the effect
of defining interference to only include employer conduct directed specifically
at leave benefits. But this conclusion takes citations from the House report
and the Chamber of Commerce's report out of context. The snippets contained
in both of those reports addressed a very specific problem: how should the
interference cause of action intersect with employers' attempts to verify leave?"
Neither the House report nor the Chamber of Commerce report addressed
situations like the policy in question, in which an employer engages in conduct
that is not designed to make sure the employee is exercising benefits properly,
but could still affect the employee's FMLA leave. These parts of the legislative
history should not be interpreted as complete statements on all employer
conduct constituting interference, but rather as statements in response to some
concerns voiced by a few affected parties.
Interpreting the legislative history to allow interference claims based on
employer conduct that do not explicitly deny FMLA rights also keeps with
Senator Packwood's understanding of what the interference cause of action
protects. In his floor speech, Senator Packwood mentions two classes of
employees that the interference cause of action protects: a mother attempting
to care for a sick child and a father dealing with a family emergency.77 Even if
the policy at issue does not constitute interference, these classes of employees
may still face adverse employment action if some intervening non-FMLA
emergency arises while they are on FMLA leave for other matters." Maintaining
a cause of action that only prohibits employer conduct directed at the leave
entitlement itself would not give full protection to these employees. Such an
interpretation also conforms to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resource's stance that the interference cause of action addresses employer
75 136 CONG. REc. S12,i67 (1990) (statement by Sen. Packwood).
76 1986 Parental and Medical Leave Act joint Hearing, supra note 7o (1986); H.R. REP. No.
101-28, pt. 2, at 26 (1989).
77 136 CONG. REC. S12,J6 7 (1990) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
78 See, e.g., supra Part I.B.
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conduct. 9 Without seeking to clearly define that conduct, the Committee's
formulation only requires that the employer conduct, whatever it is, has the
potential to deny FMLA rights or actually denies FMLA rights.s0 It need not
be specifically directed at the denial of rights themselves to have that effect.
Like the results found under the plain meaning method, the parts of the
legislative history that explicitly mention interference show that Congress
intended to protect employees against employers who would attempt to deny
employee benefits through any action. Even if the employer's actions do not
specifically prohibit the taking of leave, if they deny or have the possibility to
deny leave, then the legislative history suggests that interference is a proper cause
of action to remedy the conduct. Even though fixed attendance rate policies
are not directed at the denial of FMLA benefits themselves, they can deny
FMLA benefits by taking FMLA days out of the days worked column for the
absence rate calculation. Because the policy has the potential to deny benefits,
it is within the scope of employer conduct prohibited by the interference cause
of action as imagined by legislators overtly discussing the Act.
2. Congress's Discussion of Litigation Costs Demonstrate that Neutral Policies
Denying FMLA Rights Constitute Interference.-During the debates on the
FMLA, members of Congress voiced generalized concerns about the litigation
costs associated with the two new FMLA causes of action. But strangely,
throughout the FMLAs seven-year legislative history, no member ever
proposed changing the language of the interference cause of action to cover less
employer conduct."
As early as 1986, the Subcommittee on Labor Management, Relation,
and Labor Standards noted that the legislation might produce a large amount
of litigation.82 Similar statements regarding potential high rates of litigation
continued to circulate from 1986 to 1991,3 when Senator Bond negotiated an
FMLA compromise bill with Senator Dodd, partially to remedy such concerns
voiced by his constituents.8" The bill was changed in a number of ways to
address the litigation flood that the FMLA was expected to produce. It made
the definition of covered "employer" and "employee" more rigorous, added a
highly compensated employee exemption, incorporated a remedy procedure
that was identical to the one used in the Fair Labor Standards Act, added a
provision allowing employers to recapture health insurance premiums if the
79 S. REP. No. IOI- 7 7, at 47 (1989).
8 o Id.
81 Compare H.R. 4300, 9 9th Cong. § ioS(a)-(b) (1986), with 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)-(b) (2012)
(showing that the language of the statute has not changed).
82 1986 Parental and Medical Leave ActJoint Hearing, supra note 70 (1986).
83 H.R. REP. No. 101-28, pt. 2, at 26 (1989); see also Hearing on HR. 2, The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 199!: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ.
&Labor, IO2d Cong. 105 (1991) (statement of Rep. Armey, Member, H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor).
84 137 CONG. REc. Si 4,J32 (1991).
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employee never returns to work, included a thirty-day notice requirement
where practicable, redefined actions that constituted reinstatement, and deleted
the quadruple damages provision."
Despite the multitude of changes, some legislators were still concerned
that the FMLA did not sufficiently protect employers from litigation. Senator
Durenberger lobbied for stronger language on the type of emergencies that
would qualify an employee for leave and guidance on how promotions and
layoffs would intersect with the FMLA's new entitlements."6 He also sought
to minimize litigation under the FMLA by making all FMLA claims undergo
binding arbitration. 7 Additionally, some senators suggested changing the
remedies provisions of the bill to minimize the bill's impact on employers."
Opposing the House Committee on Education and Labor's favorable report,
several representatives expressed worry that the vagueness of the bill would lead
to heightened litigation over what constituted a serious health condition." 'They
also noted that the enforcement scheme through the Department of Labor was
far too vague.90
Though the bill had been passed and vetoed in 1991, it was close to passing
both houses again in 1992. But members of Congress still had doubts about just
how much litigation would result from the FMLA.9 ' In 1993, the conservative
wing of the legislature identified several provisions they felt made the bill
too litigious. These provisions were the lack of a written notice requirement,
the possibility that leave could be granted for an employee to take care of a
homosexual partner or unmarried partner, the failure to adequately define
"serious health condition," and the failure to adequately define "healthcare
provider."92
Despite sustained concern that the Act's provision would lead to too much
litigation, no member of Congress ever suggested tightening the definition
of interference in the statute, or defining it in the definitions section. The
interference language that became law remained unchanged from 1986 to
the FMLA's adoption in 1993.91 Since Congress did not hold any prolonged
85 Id. at S14 ,12 6- 3 2.
86 Id. at S14,i6-6 7.
87 Id.
88 See id. at S14,170.
89 H.R. REP. No. 102-135, Pt. , at 73 (1991) (minority view) ("['Serious health condition'] is
defined in grossly broad, general terms which will lead to misunderstandings between employers
and employees as to when leave is appropriate, to resultant litigation, and, frequently, to abuse of
the rights provided by this bill.").
go Id at 77 ("[N]o known labor statute gives a complainant the vague right to bring a civil
action after a charge has been filed on the basis that the agency has failed to meet 'any obligation'
under the statute in a 'timely manner."').
91 138 CONG. REc. H823 4 , H823 6, H825o (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1992).
92 H.R. REP. No. io3-8, pt. s, at 68-69 (1993); 139 CONG. REc. S13 4 3 , S1347 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1993).
93 Compare H.R. 4300, 9 9 th Cong. § ro8(a)-(b) (1986), with 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)-(b) (202).
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debates regarding the problems that might arise under a broad definition of
employer conduct that could constitute interference, it could be argued that
this omission should be interpreted to limit the type of employer conduct that
qualifies as interference. But this interpretation does not respect the common
statutory construction canon that remedial statutes, such as the FMLA, should
be construed broadly to effectuate their purposes. 4
A much more likely interpretation of legislative silence is that Congress
intended to make employer conduct constituting interference expansive under
the Act. In testimony to the House Education and Labor Committee, architects
of the bill highlighted the importance of a broad interpretation of this statute:
"[W]e hope that you and the [Department of Labor] will heed our suggestions
to interpret the law in the broadest possible way so that it can be administered
as intended . .. ."" This post-enactment language is a powerful incentive for
interpreters to set the parameters of the FMLA as widely as possible.
Since the statute is to be interpreted broadly, and the legislative history leaves
out any mention of employer conduct when addressing litigation costs, then
the discussion surrounding litigation costs in the legislative history does not
demonstrate any congressional intent to limit what types of employer conduct
constitute interference. In this way, the litigation costs discussion reinforces the
conclusions of the plain meaning method and legislators' overt references to
interference in their discussions surrounding the Act. The debate on litigation
costs makes clear that fixed attendance rate policies that deny FMLA days
as "days worked" constitute interference protected by the Act, whether or not
these policies explicitly deny benefits, because they have the effect of denying
FMLA benefits to those on intermittent leave.
3. The Code of Federal Regulations Demonstrates that a Fixed Attendance Rate
Policy Is Interference When It Discriminates Against Employees on FMLA Leave.-
The Code of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R." or "Code") paints a more complete
picture of what interference is, in keeping with the broad definition gleaned
from the statute's plain meaning and legislative history." In the Code, the word
"interference" need not refer to an employer's action that results in a denial or
restraint of an employee's FMLA rights. Instead the Code interprets the word
"interference" as "discrimination" or "retaliation."" Any employer action that
94 E.g., Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., r44 F 3 d 151, 164 (ist Cir. 1998).
95 7he i5 th Anniversary of the Family Medical Leave Act: Achievements and Next Steps.- Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections ofthe H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, ioth Cong. 3 (2008)
(emphasis added) (statement of Hon. Lynn C. Woolsey, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Workforce
Protections).
96 The Code of Federal Regulations is a proper point of inquiry for one engaging in
statutory interpretation, especially if the Code sections have been in place for a long while without
congressional response. See Kofa v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 6o F 3 d 1084, ,o88
(4th Cir. 1995); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 US. 837, 842-44
(1984); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,434 (971).
97 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2013).
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treats an employee on FMLA differently than employees not on FMLA is
a failure to reinstate an employee to her previous position under the relevant
Code sections."
To begin, the C.FR. contains general guidelines for employers administering
employment policies that conflict with FMLA leave.'The regulations make clear
that the FMLA preempts all employer action on leave management. In section
825.700, the Code establishes that the benefits mandated under the FMLA
are a floor-covered employers must provide these at a minimum in their leave
policies."'The Code also indicates that the FMLA trumps collective bargaining
agreements and private employer leave policies.' The C.F.R. then proceeds to
define interference under the FMLA. In 29 C.F.R. § 825.220, the Code states:
The Act's prohibition against interference prohibits an employer from
discriminating or retaliating against an employee or prosective employee
for having exercised or attempted to exercise FMLA igts. For example,
if an employee on leave without pay would otherwise e entitled to full
benefits other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to
be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave."e'
Here, the C.ER. equates interference with discrimination by defining
interference as discrimination. However, the term "discrimination" under the
FMLA has a different meaning than it does under Title VII. Unlike other
employment statutes, where discrimination means an adverse employment
action,102 the C.ER. indicates that discrimination simply means treating an
FMLA employee differently than a non-FMLA employee."0 3 It also states, by
reference to employee pay, that discrimination can occur and be prohibited by
the Act outside of the rights guaranteed by the FMLA. 0 4 Thus, discrimination
under the FMLA means unequal treatment of FMLA and non-FMLA
employees in all areas of employment.
Section 825.215 expands on the equal protections due to employees using
FMLA time. It notes that employees returning from FMLA are entitled to
unconditional pay increases that they would have received while on leave
and the same employee benefits that all other employees are entitled to; an
employer's failure to grant such benefits would amount to interference with an
employee's rights.105 There is, however, an outer limit to this type of interference
under the FMLA. The regulation states the following:
[I]f a bonus or other payment is based on the achievement of a specified goal
such as hours worked, products sold or perfect attendance, and the employee
98 Id. § 825.214.
99 Id. § 825-700.
soo Id.
os Id. § 825.220(c) (emphasis added).
1o2 See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 ,56-57 (2006).
103 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(C) (2013).
104 See id. § 825 .22o(b) ("Anyviolations of the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering
with, restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the Act.").
105 Id. § 825.215(c)(1), (d).
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has not met the goal due to FMLA leave, then the payment may be denied,
unless otherwise paid to employees on an equivalent leave status for a reason
that does not qualy as FILA leave. For example, if an employee who used
paid vacation leave for a non-FMLA purpose would receive the payment,
then the employee who used paid vacation leave for an FMLA-protected
purpose also must receive the payment.10
At first glance, this passage may appear to answer the question of fixed attendance
rate policies altogether, in favor of the employer who counts FMLA days
against days worked. But this passage actually lends credence to the theory that
fixed attendance rate policies can be FMLA interference when administered by
deducting FMLA days. This regulation speaks only to an employer's practice
of giving bonuses or other pay for sales goals and attendance records. It does
not cover a situation in which an employee is fired because she was unable to
meet a sales goal or an attendance performance expectation due to her time on
FMLA-the exact type of situation that arises under the fixed attendance rate
policy scenario described in this Note.'The situation in which an employee finds
herself in a fixed attendance rate policy/FMLA clash is well within the outer
limit of the C.F.R.'s FMLA interference protection because the Code speaks
to the terms of employment and not perks of employment.
A study of the Code adds to the conclusion that interference need not
be based in a denial of FMLA rights under the foregoing examinations of
legislative history.'Ihe C.F.R.'s FMLA regulations stand for the principle that
an employee on FMLA must be treated the same as a non-FMLA employee
in all areas of employment except for bonuses. Fixed attendance rate policies
mathematically treat FMLA employees differently than non-FMLA employees
because they require FMLA employees to maintain a higher attendance rate
percentage than their coworkers. Such blatant unequal treatment is against the
letter and the spirit of the law.
In summation, the legislative history analysis demonstrates that FMLA
interference occurs when an employer acts so that an employee is denied her
rights under the FMLA, even if the denial is a result of a policy not directed
at FMLA benefits. When used against FMLA employees, fixed attendance
rate policies that take FMLA days out of the days worked rate calculation
deny employees their FMLA right to take all of their leave or their right to
reinstatement by requiring an FMLA employee to be at work more than a
non-FMLA employee. Such an effect is clearly interference under the legislative
history approach."o
1o6 Id. § 825.2I5(c)(2).
107 One other Code provision might seem a likely candidate to support a claim that absence
rate policies interfere with FMLA leave. Under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c), employers cannot use the
fact that an employee took FMLA leave as negative factor in employment decisions like hiring or
discipline. This provision is applicable to interference claims. Brenneman v. MedCentral Health
Sys., 366 F 3 d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2004). But employers who use fixed attendance rate policies that do
not count FIvILA days as "days worked"do not use FMLA days negatively; they simply do not use
them at all. The effect of the policies yields negative consequences. In effect, this difference renders
the code provisions, cited supra notes 96-105, a more fitting framework in which to situate fixed
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C. 7he Common Law Approach: Introduction and Application
The common law approach to statutory construction serves as a catchall
for any other concerns that might enter into the minds of the judiciary when
making a statutory decision.'a Courts may engage in this type of inquiry
when interpreting statutes without explicitly noting the framework or source
of power for doing so.'0" This approach most often examines analogous case
law and public policy arguments to derive a clear idea of how a statute should
be applied.n0 Therefore, this section will discuss analogous case law where an
interference claim has survived when based on the application of a neutral
policy to an FMLA plaintiff. It will end with a brief discussion of public policy
concerns that may influence a judge's decision to interpret interference to
include fixed attendance rate policies.
1. 7he Case Law Approach to the Common Law Method Indicates that Fixed
Attendance Rate Policies Are Interference Because they Are Factually Identical to
Performance Prorate Cases.-Performance prorate cases arise when the plaintiff
works in a sales job or some other job with a performance quota, takes FMLA
leave, and is still held to the same performance standard despite having taken
time off for a qualifying serious health condition. When analogized to fixed
attendance rate policies, performance prorate cases support a finding that fixed
attendance rate policies are a form of interference under the FMLA.
The most often cited example of a performance prorate case is
Wojan v. Alcorn Laboratories wherein the plaintiff was a drug company
representative who took FMLA time off to have a baby."' Eighty percent of
the defendant company's yearly evaluative procedure was based on meeting
specified sales quotas for a specific drug."2 In accordance with its policy, the
company did not adjust the plaintiffs sales quotas to account for her FMLA
time away from work, and terminated her when she did not meet the yearly sales
goal."' The plaintiff brought an interference claim for her employer's failure to
adjust her performance goal, and the Eastern District of Michigan held that
attendance rate policies.
1o8 See Sperino, supra note so, at 782.
109 For example, in Dickinson, the Court considered other cases outside of its jurisdiction
that have applied absence rate policies to the FMLA in order to determine how it should interpret
interference-without ever mentioning that it was using a modified common law approach. See
Dickinson v. St. Cloud Hosp., No. 07-3346 ADM/RLE, 2008 WL 4659562, at *5-6 (D. Minn. Oct.
20, 2008).
nlo See Sperino, supra note to, at 782-3 nn.246-47; see also'Ihomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52 U. Ci. L. REV. I (1985).
in Wojan v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 07-z544, 2oo8 WL 4279365, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 15,
2008).
112 Id. at *i.
113 Id. at *2.
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she had established a prima facie case for interference under the FMLA.114
The court noted that by refusing to lower its sales quotas for an employee
who had been absent from work due to FMLA leave, "[the employer had]
evaluated [the] Plaintiff, in part, based upon time she was absent on FMLA
leave, and took employment action against her based upon that evaluation.""'
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result in Pagel v. TIN, Inc., wherein it
noted that the plaintiff's proof of unchanged sales goals despite taking FMLA
leave was enough to make out a prima facie case of FMLA interference. 16
Just like the conclusion drawn from the Code, these cases demonstrate that
interference can exist where a non-FMLA employer policy negatively affects
an employee on FMLA leave, even if it appears the policy is being applied
neutrally to all employees. In other words, discriminatory effects of policies are
prohibited under the Act. The FMLA indicates that employers are not allowed
to place more burdens on FMLA employees than non-FMLA employees
and must adjust policies so that all employees are treated fairly rather than
simply neutrally. Just as FMLA employees in the performance prorate cases are
mathematically required to make more sales per day under an employer's neutral
sales quota policy, FMLA employees are mathematically required to attend
work more often than other employees under fixed attendance rate policies.
Based on the common law approach, these cases serve as strong support for a
finding that the FMLAs interference provision should be interpreted to apply
to fixed attendance rate policies that take FMLA days out of the days worked
total in the absence rate calculation.
2. Public Policy Counsels a Finding that Fixed Rate Attendance Policies Interfere
with the FMLA Because the FMLA was Designed to Protect People Hurt by Such
Policies.-Data collected by the Department of Labor shows that enabling
employees to sue for interference after being subjected to fixed attendance rate
policies would advance the purposes of the statute. In enacting the FMLA,
Congress found that "the lack of employment policies to accommodate
working parents can force individuals to choose between job security and
parenting . . . [and that] responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women.""'1 The statute sought to remedy the difficult choice women face in
their working lives when they or their children become sick but when they also
need to work to survive.118
If fixed attendance rate policies are not found to constitute interference,
women will bear the brunt of that burden in the workforce. Persons affected by
absence rate policies are those that are on intermittent FMLA leave who take
off work for some other non-FMLA qualifying reason. Statistically, women
114 Id. at *1, *4.
115 Id. at *5.
116 See Pagel v.TIN Inc., 695 E-3d 622, 630-31 (7 th Cir. 2012).
117 29 U.S.C. § 26o1(a)(3), (5) (2012).
118 See id. § 260i(b)( 4 )-45).
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"are a third more likely to take leave than men," and women in households
with children are more likely to take leave than women in households
without children."' About twenty-four percent of those who take leave do so
intermittently.20 These employees will face FMLA interference if they ever
need to take off for a non-FMLA qualifying reason. The most recent statistics
from the U.S. Department of Labor demonstrate that women are nearly
twice more likely to be absent from work when compared to men.'"' Most
studies agree that the higher rate of absence for women of childbearing age
can be explained by the fact that women take on the lion's share of providing
care for sick children, which is usually not an FMLA-qualifying event if the
sickness is minor.'22 These women may face termination if their employer uses
a fixed rate attendance policy. Failure to consider such policies as interference
undermines the purpose of the Act because the demographic that the Act
explicitly attempts to protect-and the one that is most greatly affected by
this oversight-is women with child-rearing responsibilities. This public policy
consideration should encourage a more expansive reading of the interference
provision so that it can function to protect the class of people the FMLA was
designed to protect: working women.
Under the common law approach, both analogous case law and the public
policy considerations behind the Act counsel interpreting the interference
cause of action to include fixed attendance rate policies that take FMLA
days out of the days worked category in the rate calculation. In doing so, the
common law approach reinforces the conclusions reached by the plain meaning
and legislative intent methods.
CONCLUSION
The plain meaning, legislative history, and common law methods of statutory
analysis yield one result: not counting an employee's FMLA days as days worked
under a fixed attendance rate policy interferes with an employee's exercise of
her FMLA rights. Counting FMLA days as days worked is not a windfall for
the employee, but is demanded by the statute. Payton and Dickinson 23 achieved
the correct result under the three main branches of statutory interpretation.
Fixed attendance rate policies mathematically require FMLA employees to be
119 JACOB ALEX KLERMAN ET AL., FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL REPORT
64 (2013), available at www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012-Technical-Report.pdf.
120 Id. at 76 exhibit 4.5.I.
121 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey:
Household Data Annual Averages, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://bls.gov/cps/cpsaa46.htm
(last modified Feb. 26, 204).
122 See, e.g., JANE FARRELL & JOANNA VENATOR, PAID FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE:
UPDATED LABOR STANDARDS COULD HELP U.S. WORKERS MAKE ENDS MEET I (Aug. 16, 2012),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2ol2/o8/pdf/medical
leave-factsheet.pdf.
123 See discussion supra Part I.C.
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at work more often than non-FMLA employees. This mathematical difference
denies employees FMLA rights even though these policies are not specifically
designed to deny FMLA rights.
The Act prohibits employer conduct that disparately affects protected
employees because its language supports an expansive reading of the term
"employer conduct."12 4 Its legislative history also demonstrates congressional
commitment to this expansive reading,'25 and FMLA case law has applied this
expansive reading to analogous facts with success.126 Additionally, women with
young children will carry the largest societal burden if courts systematically
find that these policies do not interfere with FMLA rights-the FMLA
was specifically designed to protect this class of workers.' 27 Therefore, in
consideration of the purposes of the Act, its language, its history, and the case
law that flows from it, courts should follow the Payton and Dickinson example
so that an employee might be compensated for unequal treatment and, through
that compensation, vindicate her rights. Employees like Ann would be well
served by this broad interpretation and extended protection.
124 See supra Part II.A.
125 See supra Part II.B.
126 See supra Part II.C.
127 See supra Part II.C.
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